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665 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION UNDER THE ADA: ARE 
EMPLOYERS REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
INTERACTIVE PROCESS? THE COURTS SAY “YES” BUT 
THE LAW SAYS “NO” 
JOHN R. AUTRY* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)1 takes clear aim 
at a pervasive and enduring societal problem: prejudice against the 
disabled.2 The Act reflects an unambiguous congressional intent to 
eliminate disability discrimination in all facets of society, including 
the workplace.3 Before passage of the ADA, permanently disabled 
individuals had difficulty obtaining employment and those who be-
came disabled while employed frequently were terminated.4 These 
conditions resulted in high unemployment rates for the disabled, vir-
tually guaranteeing that many lived out their lives trapped in cycles of 
poverty and social dependence.5 
Title I of the ADA seeks to disrupt these cycles by mandating 
that employers take affirmative steps to employ and retain “quali-
 
 * J.D., University of Georgia, 2003; Associate, Smith, Gambrell, and Russell, LLP, At-
lanta, Georgia. The author expresses his appreciation to Dean Rebecca Hanner White of the 
UGA Law School for her commentary on this Note and her inspiration in the field of employ-
ment law. This Note is affectionately dedicated to my wife, Renee, and my daughters, Elizabeth 
and Kathryn, for their unfailing love and support. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et 
seq. (2000) (herein referred to as either the ADA or the Act). 
 2. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000) (stating that “society has tended to isolate and 
segregate individuals with disabilities” and disability discrimination “continue[s] to be a serious 
and pervasive social problem”). 
 3. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2000) (stating that one purpose of the ADA is “to provide 
a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities”). 
 4. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314 
(“Two-thirds of all disabled Americans between the age of 16 and 64 are [not] working at all”); 
see also UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM 
OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 29–31 (1983) (stating that “employer prejudices exclude handi-
capped persons from jobs” despite studies showing that disabled persons are “as productive” as 
their non-disabled co-workers). 
 5. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, supra note 4, at 32 (“Individuals with disabilities experience 
staggering levels of unemployment and poverty.”). 
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fied” disabled individuals.6 An individual is “qualified” if, despite his 
disability, he can perform the “essential functions” of the at-issue job 
with or without reasonable accommodation.7 Consequently, an em-
ployer must “reasonably accommodate” a “qualified” employee’s 
disability unless the proposed accommodation would inflict “undue 
hardship” on the employer.8 An employer may be required to revise 
the non-essential functions of a position to fit an individual’s limita-
tions, transfer an incumbent employee to a vacant position the core 
functions of which the employee can perform, or make its facilities 
accessible to disabled individuals.9 
Thus, by imposing on employers a duty of “reasonable accom-
modation,” the ADA seeks to provide unemployed disabled persons 
the opportunity to work and disabled individuals already in the work-
force the opportunity to stay there.10 The apparent simplicity of this 
objective belies the dilemma courts have faced when attempting ade-
quately and appropriately to implement a reasonable accommodation 
policy. Delineating the precise scope of an employer’s accommoda-
tion duty has proven particularly difficult. 
Congress is at least partly to blame for this confusion, for law-
makers chose to superimpose upon workplace participants a quasi-
“affirmative action” relationship without indicating how that relation-
ship might function in practice.11 For example, the ADA creates a 
reasonable accommodation substantive right for disabled individu-
als,12 but Congress failed to provide any information regarding the 
proper method by which reasonable accommodations are fashioned.13 
There is simply no statutory commentary revealing the process an 
 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000). 
 10. See Amy Renee Brown, Note, Mental Disabilities Under the ADA: The Role of Em-
ployees and Employers in the Interactive Process, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 341 (2002) (stating 
that the ADA “promise[s] a bright future of inclusion and integration for individuals with dis-
abilities” by “add[ing] them into the mainstream of American life”). 
 11. See Alysa M. Barancik, Comment, Determining Reasonable Accommodations under the 
ADA: Why Courts Should Require Employers to Participate in an “Interactive Process”, 30 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 513, 524 (1999) (stating that lawmakers “failed to articulate many important details 
concerning reasonable accommodations”). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 13. See Barancik, supra note 11, at 524 (stating that “the ADA gives the employer little 
guidance about determining the reasonable accommodation, particularly the extent to which the 
employer must be involved in the process of finding the accommodation”). 
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employer should follow when attempting to accommodate its disabled 
employee.14 
Armed with congressional authority to implement the ADA’s 
employment provisions,15 the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (“EEOC”) issued administrative rules that more specifically 
describe the method by which reasonable accommodation is to be 
achieved.16 These regulations state that “[t]o determine the appropri-
ate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] 
to initiate an informal, interactive process with the qualified individ-
ual with a disability in need of the accommodation.”17 The EEOC’s 
Interpretative Guidance to its rules states (perhaps more emphati-
cally) that “[t]he appropriate reasonable accommodation is best de-
termined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the 
employer and the qualified individual with a disability.”18 
Thus, the EEOC regulations endorse an interactive process, 
where both employer and employee strive to find a proper accommo-
dation. Significant logical force underlies such a policy, for employ-
ment issues obviously are more easily resolved where employer and 
employees communicate and cooperate. However, the Supreme 
Court has yet to determine what level of deference, if any, courts 
must give to the EEOC Regulations and Interpretative Guidance 
under Title I.19 Further, the EEOC statements utilize language that, 
contrary to the suggestion of some judges and commentators,20 can 
 
 14. See id. 
 15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2000) (the EEOC “shall issue regulations . . . to carry out this 
[title]”). 
 16. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 (1998). 
 17. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1998). 
 18. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (“Process of Determining the Appropriate Reasonable Accom-
modation”) (emphasis added). 
 19. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999) (“Because both parties 
accept [the EEOC] regulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to decide 
this case, we have no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any.”); cf., Toyota 
Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194 (2002) (“Because both parties accept the EEOC 
regulations as reasonable, we assume without deciding that they are, and we have no occasion to 
decide what level of deference, if any, they are due.”). 
 20. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom., U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (citing the EEOC’s Title I 
regulations and Interpretative Guidance and stating that “the EEOC views the interactive 
process as a mandatory obligation”); see also Sam Silverman, The ADA Interactive Process: The 
Employer and Employee’s Duty to Work Together to Identify a Reasonable Accommodation Is 
More than a Game of Five Card Stud, 77 NEB. L. REV. 281, 288 (1998) (stating that, based on 
the EEOC regulations, employers have “a duty to participate in an interactive process”); 
Christy M. Wheeler, Comment, Employment—Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.: The Interactive Process 
and the ADA, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 883, 886–87 (1999) (stating that the EEOC regulations 
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hardly be considered unequivocal: the regulations state that it “may 
be necessary” for employers to interact,21 while the Interpretative 
Guidance suggests that reasonable accommodations are “best deter-
mined” through the interactive process.22 It is, therefore, unclear 
whether even the agency itself views the interactive process as man-
datory. The Act is ultimately silent on the issue, prompting the fol-
lowing question: Is an employer required to participate in an informal, 
interactive process with its disabled employee to fashion a reasonable 
accommodation? 
Answering this question requires posing two others: First, will an 
employer incur ADA liability for failing to interact with an employee 
who is concededly disabled but who cannot show that he is statutorily 
qualified and, thus, does not fall within the class protected by Title I? 
As demonstrated later, courts have unanimously rejected employer 
liability in this situation.23 The second question is more complicated: 
Is an employer required to interact with an employee who can dem-
onstrate that he is statutorily qualified and, thus, entitled to ADA 
protection? 
The latter query has elicited a number of seemingly contradic-
tory opinions from the U.S. circuit courts of appeals.24 A majority of 
the circuits that have addressed the issue have looked to the EEOC 
regulations and explicitly imposed upon employers a duty to engage 
in the interactive process after the employee requests a reasonable 
accommodation.25 Two circuits have refused to recognize such a re-
quirement,26 while two others claim to adjudicate the issue on a case-
by-case basis.27 Thus, the circuits appear to be (and believe them-
selves to be) split on the issue.28 
Whether a circuit conflict over the issue of interactive process li-
ability exists in practice is the central focus of this Note. Part I de-
scribes the basic statutory protections provided by ADA coverage, as 
well as employer defenses to these protections. Part II introduces the 
 
“appear to require that both the employee and the employer cooperate in identifying an ac-
commodation and evaluating its reasonableness”) (emphasis added). 
 21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). 
 22. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9. 
 23. See infra notes 153–165 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 77–132 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 77–107 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 108–117 and accompanying text. 
 27. See infra notes 118–132 and accompanying text. 
 28. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting con-
flicting circuit opinions regarding interactive process requirement). 
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EEOC’s interactive process, emphasizing its background in the Act’s 
legislative history and its formal promulgation in the regulations im-
plementing Title I. Part III surveys the various judicial responses to 
the EEOC regulations and notes the puzzling vocabulary with which 
some courts articulate the employer’s duty to interact with its dis-
abled employees. 
Finally, Part IV concludes that no authority supports independ-
ent liability under the ADA for a failure to interact. The ADA’s pro-
tections under Title I run only to those disabled individuals who are 
qualified within the meaning of the Act, and all courts refuse to im-
pose liability for a failure to interact when the disabled individual is 
not statutorily qualified. Moreover, the EEOC’s regulation and In-
terpretative Guidance are not written in mandatory terms and are 
best read as not imposing independent liability for a failure to inter-
act, even when the disabled individual is qualified. Finally, despite 
some judicial language to the contrary, no circuit truly requires em-
ployers to interact with their disabled employees. Nor does the ADA, 
as currently drafted, permit the imposition of such a requirement. 
Part IV does, however, specify two situations in which a failure 
to participate in the interactive process may have significant repercus-
sions. When an employer moves for summary judgment, claiming that 
its disabled employee is not statutorily qualified, and/or when an em-
ployer claims that its good faith attempt to reasonably accommodate 
a disabled employee should immunize it against a claim for compen-
satory and punitive damages, the employer’s failure to interact could 
influence the court’s decision. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT 
Responding to rampant discrimination against disabled individu-
als,29 Congress enacted the ADA.30 The Act “provide[s] a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities” as well as “clear, strong, con-
sistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against 
 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994 & 1999 supp.) (stating that “society has tended to isolate 
and segregate individuals with disabilities” and “discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, 
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and 
access to public services”). 
 30. Id. at § 12101 et seq. 
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individuals with disabilities.”31 Title I of the ADA prohibits employ-
ment discrimination against a “qualified individual with a disability.”32 
To fall within the ambit of Title I, a plaintiff must prove both that he 
has a disability and that he is qualified, as the Act defines those 
terms.33 
A. Individual with a Disability 
An ADA plaintiff must first prove that he is disabled. The Act 
defines disability as 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of 
such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an im-
pairment.34 
Under this definition, a plaintiff is not required to establish that 
she is presently disabled. Rather, individuals who have a record of an 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity fall within the 
statutory definition, regardless of whether those individuals are cur-
rently impaired.35 Also included are individuals regarded as having a 
substantially limiting impairment, despite the fact that they are not 
actually impaired or their impairment is not substantially limiting.36 
Thus, the statutory definition of disability contains several com-
ponents. Individuals must either have a record of, or be regarded as 
having, a physical or mental impairment, which, according to EEOC 
regulations, includes both physiological and psychological disorders.37 
Further, that impairment must be substantially limiting; a person is 
 
 31. Id. at § 12101(b)(1) & (2). 
 32. Id. at § 12112(a). 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at § 12102(2); see Cruz v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 269, 279 (D. P.R. 
1999) (stating that an employee who “cannot establish that he has a disability . . . will not be 
protected by the ADA”). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B); see Valentine v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1376, 
1391 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (noting that “disability” under the ADA is “broadly defined to include” 
having a record of a substantially limiting impairment); see also Colwell v. Suffolk County Police 
Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 645–46 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C); see Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 187–90 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (discussing the factual basis under which a plaintiff may be “regarded as” disabled by 
his employer); E.E.O.C. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 
2000), aff’d in part and rev’d and remanded in part by 306 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding 
that plaintiffs were statutorily disabled because their employer “‘regarded’ them as having an 
impairment that substantially limited” a major life activity); Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 
F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that “even an innocent misperception based on nothing 
more than a simple mistake of fact as to the severity, or even the very existence, of an individ-
ual’s impairment can be sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of perceived disability”). 
 37. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1998). 
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substantially limited if totally or significantly restricted in his ability to 
perform a major life activity when compared to the general popula-
tion.38 Finally, the life activity that is substantially limited by the im-
pairment must be a major one. “Major life activities are those basic 
activities that the average person in the general population can per-
form with little or no difficulty.”39 The activity must be important or 
significant, but need not have a “public, economic, or daily aspect.”40 
Major life activities include seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, 
breathing, and learning.41 
B. Qualified Individual with a Disability 
An ADA plaintiff must also prove that she is qualified.42 A quali-
fied individual with a disability is one “who, with or without reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”43 Protec-
tion under Title I frequently turns on whether a job function is essen-
tial and whether the plaintiff can perform it “with or without 
reasonable accommodation.” 
The ADA does not define the phrase “essential job functions;” 
however, EEOC regulations state that essential job functions are “the 
fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual 
 
 38. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) & (ii); see Brookins v. Indiana Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 
993, 1001 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (noting that substantially limited under the ADA “means that the 
individual is either unable to perform, or significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which the individual can perform, a major life activity as compared to an aver-
age person in the general population”). 
 39. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(i); see Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) 
(concluding that major life activities refer “to those activities that are of central importance to 
daily life”). 
 40. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998). 
 41. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). Although the EEOC regulations state that “working” is a major 
life activity (albeit one of last resort), see 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(j), the Supreme Court has noted 
its “conceptual difficulty in defining major life activities to include work” and has declined to 
decide whether working is a major life activity. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 
471, 492 (1999) (internal quotes omitted). 
 42. See Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (S.D. Ind. 
2000) (“In order to succeed in making an ADA reasonable accommodation claim, a plaintiff 
must establish first that he was a qualified individual with a disability.”) (internal quotes omit-
ted). 
 43. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994 & 1999 supp.); see Dayoub v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 48 F. 
Supp. 2d 486, 490 (E.D. Penn. 1999) (“The ADA does not apply to individuals who are totally 
disabled and unable to work.”). 
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with a disability holds or desires.”44 The Act does state that “consid-
eration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions 
of a job are essential,” with written job descriptions being “evidence 
of the essential functions of the job.”45 When deciding whether a func-
tion is essential, judges may inquire how often the function is per-
formed, how much of the employee’s job time is occupied by the 
performance of the function, how much expertise or skill is required 
to perform the function, and how many past and current employees 
have performed or do perform the function.46 
If the court deems a job function essential, the plaintiff must 
prove that he can perform it, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion.47 Employers are liable for failing to accommodate “the known 
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability . . . .”48 One court defines “accommodation” as a 
change “in [the employer’s] ordinary work rules, facilities, terms, and 
conditions” of employment that will “enable a disabled individual to 
work.”49 Reasonable accommodations include “job restructuring, 
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant posi-
tion, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate 
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or 
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations. . . .”50 Similarly, an employer reasonably 
may be expected to modify its existing facility to permit greater use 
by disabled persons.51 
 
 44. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) app. (essential job functions 
“are by definition those that the individual who holds the job would have to perform, with or 
without reasonable accommodation, in order to be considered qualified for the position”). 
 45. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see Cruz v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 269, 281 (D. 
Puerto Rico) (stating that a judicial inquiry into which functions of an employee’s job are essen-
tial “should not second guess the employer’s business judgment regarding qualitative or quanti-
tative standards” and the employer is entitled to “substantial leeway in defining the essential 
functions of a position”). 
 46. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n); Walsted v. Woodbury County, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1332 n.6 
(N.D. Iowa 2000) (noting influential factors in determining whether job function is essential); 
Emerson v. Northern States Power Co., 256 F.3d 506, 512–13 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); see also 
Rebecca Hanner White, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: ESSENTIAL 
TERMS AND CONCEPTS, 107 (1998) (same). 
 47. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (employers “shall not discriminate against a qualified individ-
ual with a disability”) (emphasis supplied). 
 48. Id. at § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 49. Vande Zande v. State of Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). 
 51. Id. at § 12111(9)(A). 
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C. Employer Defenses to Accommodation 
The ADA requires employers to make only those accommoda-
tions that are reasonable;52 thus, where a disabled employee cannot be 
accommodated in a reasonable manner, employers are free to dis-
criminate against that individual despite his disability.53 If a plaintiff 
points to an accommodation that will render her statutorily qualified, 
her employer has the opportunity to show that the proposed accom-
modation is unreasonable.54 
Employers may also show that accommodating the plaintiff in 
the suggested manner would inflict undue hardship.55 The Act defines 
undue hardship as “an action requiring significant difficulty or ex-
pense.”56 The following non-determinative factors may be considered 
when deciding whether a proposed accommodation exposes an em-
ployer to excessive hardship: (1) “the nature and cost of the accom-
modation”; (2) the financial resources of the at-issue facility, 
including the number of persons employed and any impact the ac-
commodation would have on facility operations; (3) “the overall fi-
nancial resources” of the employer, including its size and “the 
number, type, and location of its facilities”; and (4) the type of opera-
tions performed by the employer and the relationship of the employer 
to the at-issue facility.57 
 
 52. Id. at § 12111(8) (defining qualified individual with a disability as “an individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions 
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires”) (emphasis supplied). 
 53. See Treanor v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 576 (8th Cir. 2000) (observing that 
“[t]he ADA does not prevent employer from terminating a disabled person” who cannot be 
reasonably accommodated). 
 54. See Dayoub v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 48 F. Supp. 2d 486, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting 
that a defendant seeking to avoid ADA liability “bears the burden of proving, as an affirmative 
defense, that the accommodations requested by the plaintiff are unreasonable . . .”). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see Erjavac v. Holy Family Health Plus, 13 F. Supp. 2d 737, 
749 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (stating that employers must reasonably accommodate the known physical 
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual “unless the employer demonstrates 
that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s 
business”) (internal quotes omitted). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
 57. Id. § 12111(10)(B); see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 139–40 
(2d Cir. 1995) (stating that undue hardship inquiry is one of degree, with the employer under-
taking a “common-sense balancing of the costs and benefits [of the proposed accommodation] 
in light of the factors listed in the regulations”). 
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II. A LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY INTRODUCTION TO THE 
EEOC’S INTERACTIVE PROCESS 
The preceding Part presented a general framework for ADA liti-
gation. Included in that presentation was a discussion of an em-
ployer’s responsibility to provide reasonable accommodations to 
those disabled individuals who qualify for ADA protection. The Act 
does not specify the process for determining an appropriate accom-
modation.58 The legislative history of the ADA, however, reveals that 
Congress intended the proper accommodation to be determined 
through a process of dialogue between the employer and its em-
ployee. Further, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) has issued regulations and interpretative guidance that 
countenance interaction to arrive at a reasonable accommodation. A 
discussion of these legislative materials and regulations follows. 
A. ADA Legislative History and Determination of Reasonable Ac-
commodation 
The legislative history of the ADA strongly suggests that Con-
gress intended employers and employees to work together to find a 
reasonable accommodation. Senate Report No. 101-116, which ac-
companied ADA passage, states “employers first will consult with 
and involve the individual with a disability in deciding on the appro-
priate accommodation.”59 Later in the report, the Senate notes its 
vision of the nature of an employer’s interaction with its employees: 
[E]mployer[s] should consider four informal steps to identify and 
provide an appropriate accommodation. The first informal step is 
to identify barriers to equal opportunity. This includes identifying 
and distinguishing between essential and nonessential job tasks and 
aspects of the work environment of the relevant position(s). . . . 
Having identified the barriers to job performance caused by the 
disability, the second informal step is to identify possible accom-
modations. . . . Having identified one or more possible accommoda-
tions, the third informal step is to assess the reasonableness of each 
in terms of effectiveness and equal opportunity. . . . The final in-
formal step is to implement the accommodation that is most appro-
priate for the employee and the employer and that does not impose 
an undue hardship on the employer’s operation or to permit the 
employee to provide his or her own accommodation if it does not 
 
 58. See Barancik, supra note 11, at 524 (noting that Congress “failed to articulate many 
important details concerning reasonable accommodations”). 
 59. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 65 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 348. 
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impose an undue hardship. . . . The expressed choice of the appli-
cant or employee shall be given primary consideration unless an-
other effective accommodation exists that would provide a 
meaningful equal employment opportunity.60 
Note specifically the Senate report’s choice of vocabulary: em-
ployers “will consult” with their disabled employees to find the ap-
propriate accommodation, and the “expressed choice” of the 
employee is given priority. The committee’s problem-solving ap-
proach, including employer/employee consultation, forms the basis 
for the EEOC’s Title I regulations. 
B. EEOC Regulations Regarding the Interactive Process 
The EEOC has issued both regulations and interpretative guide-
lines designed to facilitate the accommodation of disabled employ-
ees.61 Comporting with congressional sentiment,62 these regulatory 
statements specifically endorse an interactive process through which 
the appropriate accommodation is determined.63 
According to EEOC regulations, “it may be necessary for the 
[employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the quali-
fied individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.”64 The 
process “should identify the precise limitations resulting from the 
disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could over-
come those limitations.”65 Although the regulations state that the em-
ployer should initiate the interactive process,66 the employee bears 
responsibility for triggering the employer’s obligation to interact by 
providing the employer with certain information.67 
 
 60. See id. at 66–67. 
 61. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 (1998). 
 62. See supra, Part II.A. 
 63. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See Felix v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (ob-
serving that “the initial burden of requesting an accommodation [under the ADA] is on the 
employee and it is only after such a request has been made that the employer must engage in 
the ‘interactive process’ of finding a suitable accommodation”); cf. Hansen v. Henderson, 233 
F.3d 521, 523 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that, under the Rehabilitation Act, an employer has “the 
burden of exploring with the worker the possibility of a reasonable accommodation” once the 
worker “has communicated his disability to his employer and asked for an accommodation so 
that he can continue working”); Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 
2001) (noting that an employer must engage in an interactive process after employee provides 
notice of his disability). 
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The EEOC has also issued an Interpretative Guidance to its 
regulations regarding the ADA’s interactive process.68 The Interpre-
tative Guidance states that reasonable accommodation is “best de-
termined through a flexible, interactive process that involves both the 
employer and the qualified individual with a disability.”69 In some 
instances, the appropriate accommodation may be apparent without 
resorting to a step-by-step procedure.70 However, when fashioning an 
accommodation requires the consideration of significant information, 
“it may be necessary for the employer to initiate a more defined prob-
lem solving process.”71 The EEOC suggests the following steps if a 
reasonable accommodation is not obvious: 
1) Analyze the particular job involved and determine its purpose 
and essential functions; 2) Consult with the individual with a dis-
ability to ascertain the precise job-related limitations imposed by 
the individual’s disability and how those limitations could be over-
come with a reasonable accommodation; 3) In consultation with the 
individual to be accommodated, identify potential accommodations 
and assess the effectiveness each would have in enabling the indi-
vidual to perform the essential functions of the position; and 4) 
Consider the preference of the individual to be accommodated and 
select and implement the accommodation that is most appropriate 
for both the employee and the employer.72 
An analysis of the EEOC’s regulation and its Interpretative 
Guidance reveals one noteworthy semantic distinction. Speaking of 
employer attempts to accommodate, the regulation states that “it may 
be necessary” for employers to engage in an interactive process.73 By 
contrast, the Interpretative Guidance uses language that some courts 
have read as requiring employer participation in the interactive proc-
ess: the employer “must make a reasonable effort” to determine the 
appropriate accommodation, accommodation is “best determined” 
through interaction, and the employer “should” follow a four-step 
process if accommodating the individual is tricky.74 The incongruity 
between the regulation’s permissive tone and the more conclusory 
characterizations included in the Interpretative Guidance has 
 
 68. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 app. (Interpretative Guidance on Title I of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act). 
 69. Id. at § 1630.9 app. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at § 1630.2(o)(3) (emphasis supplied). 
 74. Id. at § 1630.9 app. 
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spawned a circuit split over whether the ADA requires or merely 
encourages the interactive process.75 
III. REQUIRING “INTERACTION” 
The previous Part described the origins of the ADA’s interactive 
process, including its foundation in congressional intent and its formal 
endorsement by the EEOC. This Part analyzes judicial responses to 
the EEOC’s position by posing a preliminary, but primary, question: 
Is an employer required to participate in an interactive process with 
its disabled employee to find a reasonable accommodation? As this 
Part will illustrate, the circuits have answered that question in a per-
plexing number of ways. 
A. Courts in Conflict 
Fully harmonizing the various appellate court characterizations 
of the interactive process is analytically impossible. Only one state-
ment can be made with any certainty: all circuits agree that the em-
ployer has “at least some responsibility” for fashioning the proper 
accommodation.76 Beyond this rather obvious platitude, courts tend 
to divide into three categories. Most circuits categorically that em-
ployers are required to engage in the interactive process. Two circuits 
hold that employers are not required to participate. Two others 
evaluate interactive process liability on the facts of each case. These 
three separate categories are considered in turn. 
1. Circuits that Require Employer Participation in the Interactive 
Process 
A majority of the circuit courts of appeals require employers to 
engage in the interactive process when reasonably accommodating 
disabled employees. While the circuits have characterized the em-
ployer’s obligation differently, the essential message remains consis-
tent: reasonable accommodation necessarily implies employer 
interaction. 
 
 75. See infra Part III.A; compare Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 
2000) (holding that the ADA requires employers to interact with their disabled employees to 
fashion a reasonable accommodation), with Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 
1997) (holding that employers are not required to interact). 
 76. See, e.g., Beck v. Univ. of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996); Salmon v. West 
Clark Cmty. Sch., 64 F. Supp. 2d 850, 860 (S.D. Ind. 1999). 
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In Beck v. University of Wisconsin Board of Regents,77 the Sev-
enth Circuit proffered one of the earliest opinions addressing the in-
teractive process. There, the plaintiff claimed her employer violated 
the ADA by failing to accommodate her osteoarthritis and depres-
sion.78 The employer countered that the plaintiff provided little in-
formation regarding the nature of her disability and potential 
accommodations. According to the court, “the crux of this dispute is 
one not clearly answered by the ADA: does the employer or the em-
ployee bear the ultimate responsibility for determining exactly what 
accommodations are needed?”79 The Seventh Circuit held that, while 
“[t]he employer has at least some responsibility in determining the 
necessary accommodation” and the EEOC regulations “envision an 
interactive process that requires participation by both parties,”80 the 
Beck employer had interacted. Rather, the court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s refusal to provide pertinent information thwarted the em-
ployer’s accommodation attempts.81 
Beck hardly offers a ringing endorsement of an employer’s obli-
gation to engage in the EEOC-recommended interactive process as 
the court concluded that the defendant-employer did interact.82 Thus, 
because it was not asked to resolve a dispute between the litigants as 
to whether the ADA requires interaction, the Court’s statements are 
arguably dicta. Further, while the court stated that employers have 
“at least some responsibility” for determining the appropriate ac-
commodation,83 the court does not assert that the responsibility nec-
essarily entails the interactive process suggested by the EEOC. 
Finally, the court’s use of the word “envision” when discussing the 
EEOC regulations84 raises at least the possibility that interaction is 
permissive rather than mandatory. Despite this apparent lack of 
foundation, Beck spurred a wave of judicial precedent requiring em-
ployers to engage in the interactive process. 
 
 77. 75 F.3d 1130. 
 78. Id. at 1130–31. 
 79. Id. at 1134. 
 80. Id. at 1135. 
 81. Id. at 1137; see also Templeton v. Neodata Serv., Inc., 162 F.3d 617, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(holding that an employee’s failure to provide relevant medical information defeated her claim 
that her employer failed to reasonably accommodate her disability). 
 82. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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In Taylor v. Phoenixville School District,85 the Third Circuit con-
cluded that an employer must interact with its disabled employee to 
determine a reasonable accommodation.86 There, the plaintiff alleged 
that her employer failed adequately to engage in the interactive proc-
ess, and thus failed to reasonably accommodate her disability.87 Citing 
Beck and the EEOC regulations, along with its decision in Mengine v. 
Runyon,88 which held that the Rehabilitation Act89 requires employers 
to participate in a similar interactive process, the Third Circuit held 
that “both parties have a duty to assist in the search for appropriate 
reasonable accommodation and to act in good faith.”90 The court 
adopted a four-part proof scheme allowing plaintiffs to show that a 
defendant had failed to engage in the interactive process. The plain-
tiff must show: (1) the employer knew about the employee’s disabil-
ity; (2) the employee requested accommodations or assistance for his 
or her disability; (3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to 
assist the employee in seeking accommodations; and (4) the employee 
could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s 
lack of good faith.91 
In Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc.,92 the Ninth Circuit indicated its 
agreement with the interactive process jurisprudence of the Third and 
Seventh Circuits. There, an injured employee filed suit under the 
ADA, claiming specifically that his employer failed to engage in the 
interactive process and denied him reasonable accommodation.93 Cit-
ing both Beck and Phoenixville School District, the Barnett court con-
cluded that the interactive process “is the primary vehicle for 
identifying and achieving effective adjustments which allow disabled 
employees to continue working” and is essential to accomplishing the 
goals of the ADA.94 Placing on the employee the “entire burden” to 
identify the appropriate reasonable accommodation “risks shutting 
out many workers simply because they do not have the superior 
 
 85. 184 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 86. Id. at 314. 
 87. Id. at 301–02. 
 88. 114 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 89. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1995). 
 90. Phoenixville, 184 F.3d at 312–13. 
 91. Id. at 165 (citing Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420; Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 
F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 92. 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 93. Id. at 1108. 
 94. Id. at 1112–13, 1115. 
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knowledge of the workplace that the employer has.”95 Thus, the court 
“join[ed] explicitly with the vast majority of [its] sister circuits in hold-
ing that the interactive process is a mandatory rather than a permis-
sive obligation. . . .”96 
The Fifth Circuit has also indicated its willingness to impose li-
ability for failing to interact. In Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, 
Inc.,97 the plaintiff alleged that his employer failed to reasonably ac-
commodate his bipolar disorder. The defendant moved for summary 
judgment, which the District Court granted, holding that the plaintiff 
had not requested an accommodation for his disability.98 Affirming 
the district court, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “responsibility for 
fashioning a reasonable accommodation is shared between the em-
ployee and the employer,” but only after an accommodation has been 
“properly requested.”99 Had the plaintiff appropriately requested 
accommodation, the employer’s duty to interact would have been 
triggered.100 
In Brown v. Chase Brass & Copper Co.,101 an unpublished opin-
ion, the Sixth Circuit appeared to endorse the concept of employer 
liability for failure to interact. There, in now familiar fashion, the Dis-
trict Court rejected the plaintiff’s failure to accommodate argument, 
determining instead that the plaintiff had not identified an accommo-
dation that would have enabled him to perform the essential func-
tions of his job.102 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendant 
had not engaged in the interactive process.103 Citing Beck, the court 
deemed interaction an “obligation” for employers; if an employer’s 
unwillingness to participate in the process leads to a failure to ac-
commodate its employee, “the employer might be liable under the 
ADA.”104 However, because the plaintiff did not request that the em-
ployer provide accommodation, the employer’s duty to interact 
“never arose.”105 While these comments are arguably dicta,106 they 
 
 95. Id. at 1113. 
 96. Id. at 1114. 
 97. 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 98. Id.at 157. 
 99. Id. at 165 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. (1995)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 14 Fed. Appx. 482 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion). 
 102. Id. at 484. 
 103. Id. at 487 n.2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
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nonetheless represent the Sixth Circuit’s propensity to join with its 
sister circuits in holding that employers are required to participate in 
the interactive process.107 
2. Circuits that Do Not Require Employer Participation in the 
Interactive Process 
Certain courts have stated that, although employers will incur li-
ability where they fail to reasonably accommodate a qualified indi-
vidual with a disability, and the EEOC-recommended interactive 
process is an excellent method by which to find the appropriate ac-
commodation, employers are not required to comply with the EEOC 
guidelines. Both the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits take this position. 
In White v. York International Corp.,108 the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that employers were not obligated to engage in the EEOC’s 
interactive process. The plaintiff in White brought suit against his em-
ployer when he was terminated from his job after injuring his ankle. 
The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, find-
ing that the plaintiff presented no evidence of a reasonable accom-
modation that would have rendered him statutorily qualified. On 
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the employer’s failure to initiate the 
interactive process operated as “a per se preclusion to summary 
judgment” on the issue of whether the plaintiff could have been ac-
commodated. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had 
“misconstrued an EEOC recommendation as a statutory require-
ment.”109 The court further noted that employers must make a 
“threshold determination” that a disabled individual can be accom-
modated and is therefore statutorily qualified before the recom-
mended process is even triggered.110 
The Eleventh Circuit faced the interactive process issue in Moses 
v. American Nonwovens, Inc.,111 and, like the Tenth Circuit, declined 
to impose on employers a duty to interact. In Moses, the employer 
 
 106. The Sixth Circuit was not asked to decide whether the ADA requires employers to 
engage in the EEOC-recommended interactive process. Instead, the Court ruled that the plain-
tiff had failed properly to request an accommodation, thus making the question of whether the 
defendant was required to interact to find that accommodation moot. Id. 
 107. See also Lockard v. GMC, 52 Fed. Appx. 782, 788 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion) 
(noting that it is “possible that an employer may violate the terms of the ADA by failing to 
engage in . . . an interactive process in good faith”). 
 108. 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 109. Id. at 363 (emphasis in original). 
 110. Id. 
 111. 97 F.3d 446 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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admitted that it terminated the plaintiff because of his epilepsy but 
claimed that the condition threatened the health and safety of the 
plaintiff.112 The plaintiff sued, claiming that his employer violated the 
ADA by failing to engage in the interactive process.113 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that the ADA did not recognize a cause of action based 
solely on a failure to interact.114 While it was “troubled” by the defen-
dant’s failure to investigate potential accommodations, the court 
noted that the EEOC regulations did not mandate employer interac-
tion before a disabled employee was terminated.115 Moreover, said the 
court, disabled employees have the burden of proving that an avail-
able accommodation would render them statutorily qualified, and, in 
that case, the plaintiff had not shown that such an accommodation 
existed.116 A contrary holding would confer on the employee an ADA 
cause of action even when accommodating the employee’s limitations 
was impossible, and, thus, the employee was demonstrably outside 
the ADA’s protected class.117 
3. Circuits that Determine Interactive Process Liability on a     
Case-by-Case Basis 
Certain courts adjudicate the possibility of a duty to interact 
based on an individualized, fact-intensive analysis of each case. Both 
the First and Eighth Circuits subscribe to this ideological stance to 
varying degrees. 
In Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc.,118 the First Circuit adopted 
the “case-by-case” approach. There, an epileptic employee alleged 
that his employer failed to engage in the interactive process to find an 
accommodation that would have enabled him to remain employed.119 
The plaintiff specifically argued that employers have a duty to inter-
act even where “there is no proof that any informal interactive proc-
ess would have actually borne any fruit.”120 The First Circuit 
disagreed. Surveying the disparate interpretations of the EEOC’s 
 
 112. Id. at 447–48. 
 113. Id. at 448. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.; see also Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a 
“punitive” view of the interactive process is inconsistent with the remedial policies that support 
ADA liability). 
 118. 96 F.3d 506 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 119. Id. at 509–10, 512–13. 
 120. Id. at 512–13. 
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interactive process regulations, the court stated “[t]he regulations’ use 
of the word ‘may’ clearly suggests that Congress, while it could have 
imposed an affirmative obligation upon employers in all cases, chose 
not to.”121 The court noted that “cases involving reasonable accom-
modation turn heavily upon their facts and an appraisal of the rea-
sonableness of the parties’ behavior”; “[t]here may well be situations 
in which the employer’s failure to engage in an informal interactive 
process would constitute a failure to provide reasonable accommoda-
tion that amounts to a violation of the ADA.”122 However, on the 
facts presented in Jacques, the employer could not be held liable for 
its failure to interact.123 
The Eighth Circuit has developed an analytical approach to the 
interactive process obligation that incorporates elements of other 
judicial approaches. In Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,124 the 
plaintiff accused her employer of failing to reasonably accommodate 
injuries suffered during an auto accident.125 The District Court 
granted summary judgment for the defendant, but the Eighth Circuit 
reversed. Citing both Willis v. Conopco, Inc.,126 and White v. York 
International Corp.,127 the Court of Appeals noted its tendency “to 
agree with those courts that hold that there is no per se liability under 
the ADA if an employer fails to engage in an interactive process.”128 
However, in an approach modeling the fact-based analysis advocated 
by the First Circuit,129 the court found that, “for purposes of summary 
judgment, the failure of an employer to engage in an interactive proc-
ess to determine whether reasonable accommodations are possible is 
prima facie evidence that the employer may be acting in bad faith.”130 
Thus, while employers will not be liable if accommodation was not 
possible, “a factual question exists as to whether the employer has 
attempted to provide reasonable accommodation as required by the 
 
 121. Id. at 513. 
 122. Id. at 515; see also Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 650 (1st Cir. 
2000) (noting that accommodation inquiries require “difficult, fact intensive, case-by-case analy-
ses” and are “ill-served by per se rules or stereotypes”). 
 123. See Jacques, 96 F.3d at 515. 
 124. 188 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 125. See id. at 947–48. 
 126. 108 F.3d 282, 285 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 127. 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 128. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 951–52. 
 129. See Jacques, 96 F.3d 506, 509 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 130. Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 952. 
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ADA.”131 The court then adopted the Third Circuit’s four-factor 
proof scheme for demonstrating that an employer has violated the 
ADA by failing to engage in the interactive process.132 
B. Incomprehensible Expression 
The previous discussion surveys the current state of the interac-
tive process jurisprudence in most of the circuit courts of appeals. 
While the controlling legal principles in each of the cases discussed 
eventually emerge, the vocabulary chosen by the courts to articulate 
the employer’s relationship to the interactive process is pervasively 
confusing. An inspection of these frequently strange judicial pro-
nouncements reveals two important points. First, the judiciary has 
had an extremely difficult time formulating a coherent interactive 
process jurisprudence.133 Second, when courts are as confused as the 
discussion below suggests, it is unsurprising that many ADA litigants 
have little idea how to deal with the interactive process and its poten-
tial requirements.134 
Beck135 is once again an excellent place to begin this discussion, 
not only because of its demonstrated influence on other courts that 
have confronted the interactive process issue,136 but also because Beck 
arguably initiated the language “malaise” that now pervades the cir-
cuit opinions dealing with the interactive process. Recall that the 
Beck court concluded employers bear “at least some responsibility” 
for finding the appropriate reasonable accommodation, and that the 
ADA regulations “envision” an interactive process that ultimately 
results in reasonable accommodations for qualified disabled individu-
als.137 As previously noted, at no point in the opinion does the court 
state that employers are required to interact, only that the employer 
 
 131. Id. (emphasis supplied). 
 132. Id. (adopting the reasoning of Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 165 (3d 
Cir. 1999)). 
 133. See Barancik, supra note 11, at 527–28 (noting the “confusion surrounding the interpre-
tation” of the ADA’s interactive process and the EEOC guidelines); see also Taking the ADA 
Interactive Process Seriously Can Help Employers Terminate Lawsuits Before They Go to Trial, 
16 No.17 EMPLOYMENT ALERT 4 (West 1999) (stating that “courts have had an unexpectedly 
difficult time dealing with [the interactive process]”). 
 134. See Third Circuit Tempers its Aggressive Stance on the ADA Interactive Process, 4 
No.19 EEO UPDATE 2 (West 2000) (noting that employers often have problems knowing when 
to interact and “when it’s okay to walk away from the process”). 
 135. Beck v. Univ. of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 136. See supra notes 77–107 and accompanying text. 
 137. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135. 
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has “at least some responsibility” and that the regulations “envision” 
that responsibility to include the EEOC process.138 Nonetheless, 
courts in at least four other circuits cite Beck for the proposition that 
employers are required to engage in the interactive process.139 
The second of the Beck court’s two statements—that the EEOC 
regulations envision an interactive process140—merits individual 
consideration. Significantly, a large number of circuit and district 
court opinions expressly adopted the Beck terminology. Opinions 
from the First, Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits cite Beck and 
specifically use the word “envision” to describe the employer’s 
relationship to the interactive process.141 However, as confirmed 
above, these circuits assume vastly contradictory positions on whether 
employers are required to interact. The First Circuit resolves 
employer liability on a case-by-case basis.142 The Second Circuit has 
not resolved whether employers are required to interact.143 Other 
opinions from the Seventh Circuit have construed Beck to require 
employer interaction,144 whereas the Tenth Circuit cites Beck when 
concluding that employers have no obligation to interact.145 
It is entirely possible that the Beck court did not intend to clarify 
its stance on employer requirements under the EEOC regulations 
and that the court would be amused and somewhat mystified at the 
proliferation of divergent interpretations of the regulations, all of 
which claim some precedential connection to Beck. At the very least, 
the term “envision” has proven to be a confusing and unworkable 
 
 138. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 139. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 312 (3d Cir. 1999); Barnett v. 
U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Chase Brass & Copper Co., 14 
Fed. Appx. 482, 487 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 140. Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135. 
 141. See, e.g., Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 514 (1st Cir. 1996); Jackan v. 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000); Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 
1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 142. See Jacques, 96 F.3d at 515; see also Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 143. See Jackan, 205 F.3d at 568 n.4 (noting that the EEOC regulations and “some of the 
cited decisions” impose an “obligation upon an employer to take affirmative steps to assist an 
employee in identifying potential accommodations,” but declining to decide “whether an em-
ployer bears a legal duty to assist an employee in identifying appropriate vacant positions”); see 
also Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining to 
decide whether a defendant “had an independent duty to institute and engage in an interactive 
process with the plaintiff to attempt to find a reasonable accommodation the breach of which is 
itself a violation of the ADA”) (internal quotes omitted). 
 144. See, e.g., Rehling, 207 F.3d at 1015–16; Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 633 
(7th Cir. 1998). 
 145. See, e.g., Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 1172. 
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descriptor, leaving litigants puzzled as to the status of interactive 
process liability in their circuits. 
Other courts have contributed their own inconsistent or 
confusing statements to the interactive process linguistic fiasco. For 
instance, in Jensen v. GTE Northwest, Inc.,146 the Ninth Circuit noted 
that the interactive process was crucial to the reasonable 
accommodation determination under the ADA. In Brookins, the 
Southern District of Indiana held that the ADA “contemplates” 
employer/employee interaction to find the appropriate 
accommodation.147 In Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., the Tenth Circuit 
stated that the interactive process is “frequently an essential 
component” of the pursuit for a reasonable accommodation.148 
The First Circuit, in Lessard v. Osram Sylvania, Inc.,149 noted that 
employers are “encouraged” to participate in the interactive process. 
In Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,150 the Seventh Circuit, which had 
issued the Beck opinion during its previous term, stated that the 
ADA “foresees” an interactive process, but that process is not “an 
end in itself.” Finally, in Deane v. Pocono Medical Center,151 the Third 
Circuit notes that employers who fail to engage in the interactive 
process run “a serious risk” that an opportunity to accommodate a 
disabled employee will be overlooked. 
These examples highlight the judiciary’s perplexing terminology 
choices when analyzing the EEOC regulations. Courts have had diffi-
culty articulating their own reactions to the EEOC interpretations, 
issuing opinions that conflict with the approaches of other circuits 
and, in some cases, with previous statements issued in the same circuit 
or made by the same court. This lack of clarity leaves bewildered em-
ployers unable accurately to discern their duties when searching for a 
reasonable accommodation. 
One wishes the Supreme Court finally would speak to the issue 
of employer liability for failure to interact. The Court has declined to 
 
 146. 7 Fed. Appx 778 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion). Under Ninth Circuit precedent, 
as settled by Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., the interactive process is a “mandatory rather than a 
permissive obligation.” See 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 147. Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1005 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
 148. 180 F.3d at 1172 n.10. While this statement is not necessarily inconsistent with Tenth 
Circuit precedent, see White v. York Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995), it is nonethe-
less confusing because it at least raises the possibility that employers could be obligated to 
interact in some situations. The scope of that potential obligation is not defined. 
 149. 175 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 150. 125 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 151. 142 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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resolve the issue on several occasions, most recently when it granted a 
petition for certiorari in Barnett.152 There is, however, at least one 
plausible explanation for the Supreme Court’s refusal to arbitrate the 
fate of the interactive process. The next Part discusses this theory. 
IV. THE TRUE STATUS OF EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR A FAILURE TO 
INTERACT 
The previous Part highlighted various judicial approaches to em-
ployer liability for a failure to engage in the EEOC’s interactive proc-
ess. The contrasting positions taken by the circuit courts of appeals 
were surveyed and the ambiguous language employed in some opin-
ions was explicated. This Part returns to the question posed at the 
beginning of the previous one: Is an employer required to participate 
in an interactive process with its disabled employee to find reasonable 
accommodation? 
Some of the circuit courts have imposed upon employers a duty 
to engage in the interactive process. However, this Part argues that, 
because the ADA protects only those disabled persons who are statu-
torily qualified, and because ADA liability attaches for a failure to 
accommodate an employee’s disability, not a failure to interact with 
the employee regarding the accommodation, there are no circuits that 
currently require employers to interact, nor is any court permitted to 
impose such a requirement unless the ADA is amended. 
A. “Independent” Liability and Proving Qualification 
In assessing the validity of this argument, one must first be famil-
iar with the concept of independent employer liability. Independent 
liability would attach in all situations where employers have failed to 
interact with a disabled employee. That is, an employer could be “in-
dependently” liable under the ADA for failing to engage in the inter-
active process, regardless of whether the at-issue employee is 
statutorily qualified, and, thus, a member of the ADA’s protected 
class. Opinions from virtually every circuit, including those that re-
quire employers to engage in the interactive process, have soundly 
rejected this argument. 
 
 152. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 532 U.S. 970 (2001). 
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For example, in Kvorjak v. Maine, 153 the First Circuit rejected the 
concept of independent liability for failure to interact. In Kvorjak, the 
plaintiff claimed that his former employer “wrongfully failed to 
accommodate his disability” by refusing to allow him to work from 
home.154 The plaintiff specifically alleged the employer “violated the 
ADA by failing to utilize an informal, interactive process to make an 
individualized assessment of his needs and abilities.”155 The First 
Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the employer. 
Addressing the plaintiff’s interactive process argument, the court 
stated that liability for failure to interact “depends on a finding that, 
had a good faith interactive process occurred, the parties could have 
found a reasonable accommodation that would enable the disabled 
person to perform the job’s essential functions.”156 Where the 
employer fails to engage in the interactive process, “such an omission 
[is] ‘of no moment’ if the record forecloses a finding that the plaintiff 
could perform the duties of the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodation.”157 Thus, where the plaintiff is not statutorily 
qualified, the employer is not required to interact. 
The Ninth Circuit, whose mandatory obligation approach to the 
ADA’s interactive process is arguably the most rigorous of the 
approaches taken by the circuits,158 rejected the concept of 
independent employer liability in both Barnett159 and Humphrey v. 
Memorial Hospitals Association,160 its leading interactive process 
opinions. Both Barnett and Humphrey involved disabled plaintiffs 
who had been denied accommodation by their employers.161 Both 
courts were reviewing grants of summary judgment in favor of 
employers, and both took the opportunity to hold that the EEOC’s 
interactive process is “a mandatory rather than a permissive 
obligation.”162 However, each court expressly dismissed the notion of 
independent employer liability for a failure to interact. The Barnett 
court held that “employers, who fail to engage in the interactive 
 
 153. 259 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 154. Id. at 50. 
 155. Id. at 52. 
 156. Id. (citing Humphrey v. Mem Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001); Barnett v. 
U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 157. Id. at 53 (quoting Soto-Ocasio v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 150 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1998)). 
 158. See id. at 52. 
 159. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116. 
 160. 239 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 161. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108; Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1130–33. 
 162. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1108, 1114; Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1137. 
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process in good faith, face liability for the remedies imposed by the 
statute if a reasonable accommodation would have been possible.”163 
Similarly, in Humphrey, the court held that the defendant had an 
“affirmative duty under the ADA to explore further methods of 
accommodation before terminating” the plaintiff; however, this 
affirmative duty to interact arose only after the court assumed that 
the plaintiff “was a qualified individual with a disability.”164 Thus, 
according to both courts, an employer is not liable under the Act even 
where it refuses to interact unless its refusal also led to a failure to 
accommodate and a reasonable accommodation was available to 
render the plaintiff statutorily qualified. 
The conclusions reached in these opinions are representative of 
the sentiments shared by all of the circuits that have commented on 
the interactive process requirement.165 For those circuits that claim to 
require employer interaction where the plaintiff is statutorily quali-
fied, the next question is a difficult one: When will the employer be 
liable if it doesn’t participate? 
B. Accommodation or Interaction? 
The previous section established that an employer will not be 
held liable for failing to engage in the interactive process when the 
disabled individual seeking accommodation is not statutorily quali-
fied. The corollary to that statement is simple: If liability is the 
mechanism that insures interaction, then employers are required to 
interact only with qualified individuals. However, the question re-
mains: Are employers required to interact with those disabled per-
sons who are statutorily qualified? 
Courts that require employers to interact contend that they are 
assigning ADA liability for a failure to engage in the process.166 On 
 
 163. Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116 (emphasis supplied). 
 164. Humphrey, 239 F.3d at 1137, 1139. 
 165. See, e.g., Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Beck 
v. Univ. of Wis., 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996)), and concluding that, when assigning ADA 
liability to employers, it is insufficient for plaintiffs to show that the employer simply failed to 
engage in the interactive process; rather, the plaintiff must show “that the result of the inade-
quate interactive process was the failure of the [defendant] to fulfill its role in ‘determining what 
specific actions must be taken by an employer’ in order to provide the qualified individual a 
reasonable accommodation”). 
 166. See, e.g., Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116 (threatening the imposition of ADA liability for a 
failure to engage in the interactive process); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174 
(10th Cir. 1999) (same); Taylor v. Phonixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 317–18 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(same); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); 
Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996) (same). 
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closer inspection, however, this contention is manifestly false. For 
instance, in Barnett, the court held that it could not impose employer 
liability unless the interactive process would have disclosed a reason-
able accommodation that allowed the plaintiff to perform the essen-
tial functions of his job.167 Thus, the court looks for evidence of 
appropriate accommodations that the defendant failed to discover 
when it did not interact. The key to liability, then, is the defendant’s 
failure to implement one of the available appropriate accommoda-
tions, not the failure to interact with the plaintiff. On this basis, courts 
will never impose liability on an employer for its failure to engage in 
the interactive process, only for its failure to accommodate. This is 
consistent with the text of the Act, which requires employers to rea-
sonably accommodate disabled individuals, not to interact with 
them.168 
The distinction is more than semantic. Consider the following 
hypothetical: An employee alerts his employer to the status of his 
disability, which will limit his job performance as his position is cur-
rently constituted. The employee requests an accommodation for his 
disability, triggering the employer’s obligation to engage in the inter-
active process. The employee’s job functions are complicated, and his 
disability interferes in differing ways with those functions; thus, the 
employee is expecting a complex dialogue regarding the potential 
accommodations. However, no such dialogue occurs; there are no 
meetings, no conversations, no medical evaluations, nothing that a 
court could label “interaction.” Instead, the employee receives notice 
via registered mail that his disability will be accommodated in a cer-
tain manner; the notice identifies the relationship between the em-
ployee’s limitations and the specific accommodations proposed by the 
employer. Apart from his initial request for an accommodation, this 
letter is the employee’s one and only communication with his em-
ployer on the matter. 
Assume that the accommodations described by the employer are 
reasonable and allow the employee to perform the essential functions 
of his job, thus making him statutorily qualified, but the employee is, 
nonetheless, dissatisfied with them. Could the employee successfully 
allege that the employer had failed to engage in the interactive proc-
 
 167. 228 F.3d at 1116. 
 168. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that employers may be held liable for “not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability”). 
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ess? Phrased differently, can the means justify employer liability 
where the end is demonstrably within the law? 
While the answer to this question is ultimately unclear, it seems 
very unlikely that any of the opinions discussed in this Note could be 
interpreted as imposing employer liability under these circumstances. 
Even those circuits that require employers to interact would have 
difficulty justifying the imposition of liability on these facts. The 
plaintiff’s limitations have been reasonably accommodated, and the 
foremost purpose of the ADA’s accommodation provisions, keeping 
disabled persons in the workforce, has been accomplished. Thus, a 
court imposing liability for failure to interact on these facts would be 
following a path that all courts have expressly repudiated—imposing 
employer liability independent of the circumstances. 
There is, then, no situation (and no circuit) in which an employer 
is required by law to engage in the interactive process. Liability at-
taches under the ADA if the employer fails to reasonably accommo-
date the limitations of an employee’s disability.169 The scenario 
described above demonstrates that fashioning a reasonable accom-
modation under the ADA certainly is not dependent upon interacting 
with the disabled employee. In fact, a failure to interact may be quite 
irrelevant to the reasonable accommodation inquiry. This conclusion 
is statutorily compelled: ADA liability attaches only where the em-
ployee could have been reasonably accommodated but was not. If the 
employee has been reasonably accommodated, ADA liability cannot 
attach, regardless of whether the accommodation was produced with-
out employee input. Thus, those courts that recognize an interactive 
process participation requirement are fooling themselves and their 
litigants; the ADA, as currently drafted, permits no such requirement. 
C. The Continued Relevance of Employer Participation in the 
Interactive Process 
From the previous discussion, an employer could conclude that it 
will receive no benefit from participating in the EEOC-recommended 
interactive process, indeed that the interactive process is virtually 
irrelevant in the ADA litigation context. That conclusion, however, is 
inaccurate and reliance on it may prove detrimental. The final portion 
of this Note briefly analyzes two situations in which an employer’s 
failure to interact could be damaging. 
 
 169. See id. 
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1. Employer Motions for Summary Judgment 
Once a disabled employee has filed suit claiming that her em-
ployer has failed to reasonably accommodate her limitations, the em-
ployer may move for summary judgment. Several allegations 
supporting summary judgment are available to employers at this stage 
in the litigation; however, for purposes of this discussion, the most 
important of these is an employer allegation that the employee is not 
statutorily qualified and, therefore, does not fall within the ADA’s 
protected class. 
As previously discussed, a disabled individual must be able to 
demonstrate his ability to perform, with or without reasonable ac-
commodation, the essential functions of the at-issue position to be 
deemed statutorily qualified and, therefore, subject to ADA protec-
tions.170 In reasonable accommodation cases, most courts impose 
upon the plaintiff the burden of identifying a facially reasonable ac-
commodation that renders him statutorily qualified.171 If a plaintiff 
cannot identify an accommodation that will enable him to perform 
the essential functions of the at-issue position, the court likely will 
conclude that the plaintiff is not a member of the ADA’s protected 
class and grant the employer’s motion for summary judgment.172 
However, an employer’s failure to communicate with its disabled 
employee regarding the possibility of reasonable accommodation can 
deal a significant blow to the employer’s summary judgment motion. 
Where it is clear that the employer made no effort to aid the em-
ployee’s search for accommodation, courts have been reticent to 
grant summary judgment, even if the employee is unable to identify 
an accommodation that would render them qualified. In fact, several 
 
 170. Id. at § 12111(8). 
 171. See Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
employees are “required to make a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible”); 
Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that plaintiff could 
defeat employer motion for summary judgment only “by producing probative evidence that 
reasonable accommodations were available”); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, 117 
F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that “the burden of identifying an accommodation that 
would allow a qualified individual to perform the job rests with that individual, as does the 
ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to demonstrating that such an accommodation is 
reasonable”); Brookins v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1000 (S.D. Ind. 
2000) (noting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is a qualified individual with 
a disability); see also Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp, 101 F.3d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Recov-
ery under the ADA . . . requires a plaintiff to establish she is a qualified individual with a dis-
ability.”). 
 172. See Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 58 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that summary judgment 
is appropriate where plaintiff cannot prove membership in the ADA’s protected class). 
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circuits have held that a failure to interact in good faith operates as a 
per se bar to an employer’s obtaining summary judgment in cases 
where its employee is unable to identify a reasonable accommoda-
tion. 
In Phoenixville School District,173 the Third Circuit adopted this 
approach. The plaintiff there claimed that her employer failed to rea-
sonably accommodate her mental illness. The employer moved for 
summary judgment, contending that its employee had failed to iden-
tify an accommodation that would have rendered her statutorily 
qualified. The district court granted summary judgment for the em-
ployer, but the Third Circuit reversed.174 Discussing the issue of rea-
sonable accommodation, the court noted that employers were 
required to “make a good-faith effort to seek accommodations.”175 
While the employer will not be held liable at trial if there is no evi-
dence that a reasonable accommodation existed, the court stated: 
“When an employee has evidence that the employer did not act in 
good faith in the interactive process, . . . we will not readily decide on 
summary judgment that accommodation was not possible and the 
employer’s bad faith could have no effect.”176 The court concluded 
that validating summary judgment in this situation would “effectively 
eliminate the requirement that employers must participate in the in-
teractive process.”177 “Thus, where there is a genuine dispute about 
whether the employer acted in good faith, summary judgment will 
typically be precluded.”178 
It remains the ADA plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate the exis-
tence of a reasonable accommodation, and a plaintiff’s inability to 
identify an accommodation at trial will result in a verdict for the em-
ployer.179 However, most courts will not adjudicate the reasonable 
 
 173. Taylor v. Phonixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 174. Id. at 320. 
 175. Id. at 317. 
 176. Id. at 318. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.; see also Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
“an employer cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage if there is a genuine dispute as to 
whether the employer engaged in good faith in the interactive process”), judgment vacated by 
535 U.S. 391 (2002); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(same); Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) (refusing to grant 
summary judgment where employer may not have interacted in good faith); Baert v. Euclid 
Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 1998) (same). 
 179. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that, even 
where an employer overtly fails to interact, the plaintiff will not be entitled to recover 
“unless . . . a reasonable accommodation was possible”). 
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accommodation issue at the summary judgment stage if the plaintiff 
has evidence that his employer acted in bad faith. This provides a 
powerful incentive for employers to fully participate in the interactive 
process; trials are time-consuming and especially frustrating where 
the employer could have obtained the same outcome at significantly 
less expense. 
Thus, failing to interact could remove the potency of summary 
judgment, one of an employer’s most powerful litigation tools. While 
that consequence is certainly not trivial, the ultimate outcome at trial 
remains the same, as demonstrated by the analysis above. Employers 
will not incur ADA liability simply because they fail to participate in 
the interactive process; therefore, the interactive process is not re-
quired. As the preceding commentary suggests, however, employers 
should carefully consider the ramifications of choosing not to interact. 
2. Employee Claims for Compensatory and Punitive Damages 
Employers face one other specter that should motivate them to 
engage in the interactive process: the availability of compensatory 
and punitive damages under the ADA. While case law on this point is 
scant, it appears that an employer who makes a good faith effort to 
reasonably accommodate its disabled employee but ultimately fails to 
accomplish this goal may be able to avoid a judicial imposition of 
compensatory and punitive damages, even where the employee can 
point to an accommodation that is reasonable. 
Section 107(a) of the ADA, when read in concert with section 
1981a(a)(2) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, gives a plaintiff who 
proves intentional discrimination because of his disability the right to 
recover both compensatory and punitive damages.180 With regard to 
reasonable accommodation claims, however, the possibility of com-
pensatory and punitive awards is limited by the language of section 
1981a(a)(3): 
damages may not be awarded under this section where the [em-
ployer] demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the 
person with the disability who has informed the [employer] that ac-
commodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable accom-
modation that would provide such individual with an equally 
effective opportunity and would not cause an undue hardship on 
the operation of the business.181 
 
 180. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). 
 181. Id. at § 1981a(a)(3). 
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Thus, if an employee presents evidence of an accommodation 
that would have rendered her statutorily qualified, her employer will 
incur ADA liability if it did not provide an accommodation. This re-
mains true even when the employer engaged in an extensive interac-
tive process about which the employee had no complaints. In a sense, 
then, ADA liability for failure to accommodate is strict: If an em-
ployer could have accommodated its disabled employee but failed to 
do so, liability attaches despite the employer’s good faith efforts. 
However, an employer’s good faith attempt to provide accom-
modation can greatly limit the type of relief available to an ADA 
plaintiff. If an employer is deemed to have pursued in good faith a 
reasonable accommodation for its employee, but failed in that pur-
suit, the employer will incur ADA liability if an accommodation ex-
isted but may be immunized from claims for compensatory and 
punitive damages. Interaction in the manner recommended by the 
EEOC should constitute strong evidence that an employer responded 
to a request for accommodation in good faith. By contrast, the court 
could characterize a failure to follow the EEOC guidelines as evi-
dence of the employer’s bad faith. That characterization may deprive 
the employer of an opportunity to avoid compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
Howell v. Michelin Tire Corp.182 illustrates the application of the 
good faith standard found in section 1981a(a)(3) to an ADA plain-
tiff’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages. In Howell, the 
plaintiff claimed that his employer acted in bad faith when it failed to 
reasonably accommodate his disability. The employer moved for 
summary judgment, contending that it had attempted in good faith to 
reasonably accommodate the plaintiff and should therefore be immu-
nized from compensatory and punitive assessments. The court denied 
the employer’s motion, holding that summary judgment was inappro-
priate because each party presented sufficient evidence of its claims.183 
Whether the employer’s attempts to accommodate its employee met 
the good faith substantive standard of section 1981a(a)(3) was an is-
sue correctly decided by the fact-finder.184 However, the court did 
imply a willingness to decide the issue of good faith at the summary 
judgment stage in the appropriate case. Thus, Howell arguably stands 
for the proposition that an employer that has gone to great lengths to 
 
 182. 860 F. Supp. 1488 (M.D. Ala. 1994). 
 183. Id. at 1494. 
 184. Id. 
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accommodate a disabled employee may be able to obtain summary 
judgment on the issue of compensatory and punitive damage 
awards.185 
Again, an employer will be held liable under the ADA if it could 
have reasonably accommodated a disabled employee but failed to do 
so. Thus, as previously discussed, ADA liability is not affected by 
employer participation in the interactive process, even if the scope 
and intensity of the employer’s interaction are regarded as exemplary 
by all parties. A good faith attempt to accommodate the employee 
will, however, immunize the employer from claims for compensatory 
and punitive damages and the EEOC’s interactive process may con-
stitute one manner in which to demonstrate good faith section 
1981a(a)(3). The opportunity to avoid compensatory and punitive 
awards should persuade employers to participate in the EEOC-
recommended interactive process. 
CONCLUSION 
Formulating an adequate judicial response to the ADA’s reason-
able accommodation provision has proven to be quite a daunting 
task. Congress failed even to comment on many of the specific details 
arising from the accommodation substantive right; the process by 
which reasonable accommodation should be achieved is not explained 
anywhere in the Act. As demonstrated by this Note, the EEOC 
statements endorsing an “informal, interactive process” as the “best” 
avenue for arriving at reasonable accommodation have failed to settle 
the issue. Some courts have interpreted the EEOC guidelines as re-
quiring employers to participate in an interactive process, while other 
courts cite the same EEOC language in support of a conclusion that 
the ADA does not require employer interaction. In short, the interac-
tive process jurisprudence arising out of the circuits appears to be a 
confused mess. 
This Note attempts to provide some clarity to the interactive 
process issue. All of the federal appeals courts agree that employers 
should participate in some type of interactive process with their dis-
abled employees. The circuits believe themselves to be in conflict 
over whether the employer must engage in that process. However, a 
 
 185. See also Szedlock v. Tenet, 139 F. Supp. 2d 725, 732 (E.D. Va. 2001) (noting that good 
faith attempts to accommodate a disabled individual will immunize an employer from a com-
pensatory damages claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq., but refusing to 
disturb a jury determination that the defendant had not acted in good faith). 
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close inspection of their opinions reveals no actual conflict. ADA 
liability attaches for the failure to accommodate where accommoda-
tion would have been possible. If an accommodation was possible but 
not provided, the fact that the employer sincerely tried to provide an 
accommodation will not shield it from liability. If accommodation was 
not possible, the fact that the employer did not attempt to find it will 
not render the employer liable. Thus, the failure or success of the 
interactive process is ultimately irrelevant to the imposition of ADA 
liability for failure to reasonably accommodate. Despite some grandi-
ose pronouncements to the contrary, all of the appeals courts that 
have confronted the issue have at least implicitly recognized this fact 
and have refused to impose ADA liability independent of the circum-
stances. 
That is not to say that employer interaction is wholly unimpor-
tant. Employer motions for summary judgment on the ground that an 
employee is not statutorily qualified likely will be precluded if the 
employer did not make reasonable attempts to find an appropriate 
accommodation for its disabled employee. Further, as discussed 
above, a failure to interact may deprive an employer of the opportu-
nity to avoid compensatory and punitive damages. These conse-
quences are certainly not insignificant; however, neither ultimately 
influences the inquiry into ADA liability for a failure to engage in the 
interactive process. 
Thus, the status of the EEOC-recommended interactive process 
remains unsettled. Undoubtedly, problems in the employment con-
text are best solved through interactive communication. That gener-
alization, however, does not help us answer the real question posed 
by this Note: In the specific context of fashioning a reasonable ac-
commodation, is the best way necessarily the required way? Because 
the ADA will not permit the imposition of liability for a failure to 
interact, this Note concludes that the answer is no. 
